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FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS—“SEE YA IN BOSTON, 
BRUH”1: MAKING THE LINK BETWEEN THE RIGHT TO 
PETITION, ACTIVISM, AND THE MASSACHUSETTS ANTI-
SLAPP STATUTE 
Heidi K. Waugh 
Conceptual understandings of political engagement in the digital age 
continue to evolve as social media and the real-time web reconfigure 
the ways in which we exchange information.  Despite the increasing 
application of e-campaigns, online petitions, and large-scale digital 
protests, reciprocity between the governed and the government 
continues to endure as the hallmark of representative democracy.  The 
right to petition, contained within the final clause of the First 
Amendment, embodies this central tenet and constitutes the core of the 
Massachusetts Anti-SLAPP Statute—legislation that provides a 
special motion to dismiss lawsuits designed to chill public 
participation in government. 
Massachusetts anti-SLAPP jurisprudence is at a critical juncture.  As 
each special motion to dismiss comes to pass, the courts must grapple 
with the statute’s expansive scope and the shifting contours of political 
engagement in the twenty-first century.  Increasingly, citizens are 
engaging in activities that were not originally contemplated by the 
statute and seeking protection under the anti-SLAPP paradigm.  As 
ever more complex scenarios arise, how are courts to determine which 
activities meet the statutory definition of petitioning?  This Note 
 
* Candidate for J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2019. Sincere 
thanks to Associate Dean Pat Newcombe for her insight, guidance, and understanding 
throughout the Note writing process.  I would also like to express my gratitude for the Western 
New England Law Review staff’s steadfast commitment to getting it right. 
1. Barry Meier, Science Consultant Pushes Back Against Unlikely Opponents, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/12/business/energy-environment/years-
after-criticism-of-its-practices-science-consultant-pushes-back.html. 
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argues that courts must objectively assess a statement’s content, 
manner of issuance, and proximity to government action when 
determining the scope of petitioning activity.  In the absence of an 
interpretive framework that is both consistent with the language and 
the policies underlying the statute—namely promoting and protecting 
an involved citizenry—the judiciary is bound to frustrate, rather than 
effectuate, the statute’s legislative intent. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, Professors Penelope Canan and George W. Pring warned 
Americans that a new breed of intimidation litigation was stalking the 
nation.2  In their capacity as advocates and scholars, Canan and Pring 
observed a proliferation of cases in which citizens were being sued for 
circulating petitions, testifying at public hearings, and reporting violations 
of law.3  In an effort to draw attention to the dire consequences posed by 
such suits—namely, the chilling of public participation—the pair created 
the term “strategic lawsuits against public participation” (SLAPPs) in 
government.4  Since that time, scholars have characterized the typical 
SLAPP scenario as an instance in which a powerful entity files a frivolous 
action against an opponent with fewer resources in order to stifle political 
activity.5  Often, these meritless lawsuits are either dropped or dismissed.6  
 
2. GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT 
1 (1996).  In 1996, George W. Pring was a professor of law and Penelope Canan was an associate 
professor of sociology at the University of Denver.  Id. at cover copy.  At that time, Pring and 
Canan were also co-directors of the Political Litigation Project at the University of Denver; an 
interdisciplinary initiative instituted in 1984 for the purposes of research and education.  Id.  
Today, Pring is professor of law emeritus at the University of Denver.  Faculty & Staff 
Directory, UNIV. DENVER, https://www.law.du.edu/faculty-staff/george-pring 
[https://perma.cc/UXU2-DVFN].  Canan is professor emerita of the Sociology Department at 
the University of Central Florida; she retired from the UCF Sociology Department in December 
2012.  UCF Sociology, People, UNIV. CENT. FLA., https://sciences.ucf.edu/sociology/
people/canan-penelope/ [https://perma.cc/LJ74-5TNW]. 
3. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 2–3; see also Citizen Activism Under Attack: 
Lawsuits Used to Silence Critics, NEW CITIZEN (1992), http://www.main.nc.us/
cml/new_citizen/TNCv1n1.html#9 [https://perma.cc/A4K5-FM8W] (recounting examples of 
citizens being sued for petitioning against development projects in their communities). 
4. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 3. 
5. Rebecca Ariel Hoffberg, The Special Motion Requirements of the Massachusetts Anti-
SLAPP Statute: A Real Slap in the Face for Traditional Civil Practice and Procedure, 16 B.U. 
PUB. INT. L.J. 97, 97 (2006); see Richard J. Yurko & Shannon C. Choy, Reconciling the Anti-
SLAPP Statute with Abuse of Process and Other Litigation-Based Torts, 51 BOS. B.J. 15, 15–
16 (2007). 
6. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 1.  Although early SLAPPs rarely prevailed in court, 
mounting a successful defense consumed a substantial amount of time.  Id. at 218.  Pring and 
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But the underlying purpose of the action—deterring citizens from freely 
engaging in government by imposing the costly and stressful burdens of 
litigation—is often achieved.7 
Because SLAPPs target “the right of the people . . . to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances,”8 the lawsuits’ negative 
implications arguably affect all citizens.9  As Canan and Pring explained: 
The ominous new risk for those who express their views to the 
government is that opponents—not content with rebuttal in the same 
public forums—will drag citizens out of the political arena and into 
the courthouse with staggering personal lawsuits.  The “chilling” 
effect [of] this new breed of cases on public debate and citizen 
involvement is already significant; the possible effect on the future of 
our society and its public-participatory form of government is even 
more threatening.10 
In recognition of this threat, and in an effort to preserve a core feature 
of the democratic process, over thirty states—including Massachusetts—
have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes.11  Anti-SLAPP statutes target lawsuits 
that are intended to chill a party’s exercise of its right to petition by 
 
Canan found that on average, the lawsuits lasted forty months.  Id.  Some suits, however, 
endured for as long as thirteen years.  Id. 
7. See id. at 3 (“[W]e conservatively estimate that thousands have been sued into silence, 
and that more thousands who heard of the SLAPPs will never again participate freely and 
confidently in the public issues and governance of their town, state, or country.”); see also What 
is a SLAPP Suit?, ACLU OHIO, https://www.acluohio.org/slapped/what-is-a-slapp-suit 
[https://perma.cc/S2UL-P42Q] (“In addition to engendering fear and intimidation, the party 
initiating the suit (SLAPPOR) often seeks to bleed the other party (SLAPPEE) of resources and 
produce a chilling effect .  .  .  .”). 
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
9. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 2. 
10. Id. 
11. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-752 (2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-63-504 (2018); CAL. 
CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8136 (2018); D.C. CODE 
§ 16-5502 (2018); FLA. STAT. § 768.295 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (2018); HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 634F-2(9) (2018); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/15 (2018); IND. CODE §§ 34-7-7-1 
to 34-7-7-10 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5320 (2018); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971 
(2018); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2018); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-
807 (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2018); MINN. STAT. § 554.02 (2018); MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 537.528 (West 2018); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-21 (West 2018); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 41.635–670 (West 2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1 (West 2018); N.Y. CIV. 
RIGHTS LAW § 70-a (McKinney 2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1430–38 (West 2018); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 31.150 (2018); 27 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8302 (2018); 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2 
(2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-1003 (2018); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.003 
(West 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-1403 (West 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1041 
(2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-223.2 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510 (2018); 7 GUAM 
CODE ANN. § 17104 (2018). 
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creating a special motion to dismiss that the targeted party may file prior 
to any discovery.12  Although the text of the statutes vary from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction, all anti-SLAPP legislation recognizes that “the single 
element of reaction to political action . . . distinguishes SLAPPs from the 
everyday retaliatory lawsuit[].”13  Therefore, in determining whether a 
lawsuit is in fact a SLAPP, and whether a statement is entitled to immunity 
under anti-SLAPP legislation, courts must frequently decide whether the 
party seeking protection exercised their constitutional right to petition the 
government.14 
Enter Cherri Foytlin and Karen Savage: environmental activists who 
penned and published an article on the Huffington Post’s Green Blog in 
October of 2013.15  The blog post, titled ChemRisk, BP and Purple 
Strategies: A Tangled Web of Not-So-Independent Science,16 concerned a 
specific study that ChemRisk, a scientific consulting company, conducted 
and released on behalf of British Petroleum (BP) following the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill.17  In furtherance of the study, ChemRisk considered “the 
extent to which [off-shore] cleanup workers responding to the Deepwater 
Horizon spill had been exposed to the [airborne] chemicals benzene, 
toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylene (collectively known as BTEX).”18  
Whereas the final report indicates that cleanup workers endured levels of 
exposure “well below the Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs) established 
by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).”19  
 
12. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2018). 
13. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 8. 
14. Id.; see also Jeffrey J. Pyle, Cardno ChemRisk v. Foytlin: Supreme Judicial Court 
Holds That Anti-SLAPP Law Protects Opinion Writing, BOS. B.J. (May 11, 2017), 
https://bostonbarjournal.com/2017/05/11/cardno-chemrisk-v-foytlin-supreme-judicial-court-
holds-that-anti-slapp-law-protects-opinion-writing/ [https://perma.cc/7M7N-YVHW] 
(contending that special motions to dismiss under anti-SLAPP statutes “are typically won or 
lost on the question of whether [the activity] . . . is ‘petitioning.’”). 
15. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, 68 N.E.3d 1180, 1184 (Mass. 2017); see Meier, 
supra note 1. 
16. Cherri Foytlin & Karen Savage, ChemRisk, BP and Purple Strategies: A Tangled Web 
of Not-So-Independent Science, HUFFPOST (Oct. 14, 2013, 12:29 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/chemrisk-bp-and-purple-st_b_4095131.html 
[https://perma.cc/9C2E-56GX]. 
17. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1183.  The oil spill occurred on April 20, 2010.  
Id.  The explosion of Deepwater Horizon, a BP oil rig, resulted in “approximately 4.9 million 
barrels of oil . . . flow[ing] into the Gulf of Mexico, some forty miles off the coast of Louisiana.”  
Id. 
18. Id. at 1184; Foytlin & Savage, supra note 16. 
19. ChemRisk LLC, Study by Leading Scientific Consulting Firm Finds No Evidence of 
Health Dangers for Gulf Coast Cleanup Workers, CISION (Sept. 2, 2011, 4:04 PM), 
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Foytlin and Savage suggest that ChemRisk’s “science” is a product of 
“truth-for-hire” that fails to tell the whole story.20 
In the blog post, Foytlin and Savage initially contextualize their 
skepticism of ChemRisk’s BTEX report against the backdrop of litigation 
then-ongoing in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana.21  According to the authors, the trial bore witness to a 
“scientific battle” between the Department of Justice (DOJ) and BP 
experts over the amount of oil that escaped in 2010.22  The blog continues 
by stating: 
As [the DOJ] alluded [at trial], BP does not exactly have a 
reputation for coming clean on the facts surrounding the disaster.  
Early on, the oil giant told the public that the leak was an estimated 
5,000 barrels per day, yet according [to] the company’s own internal 
emails BP knew that up to 100,000 barrels per day were flowing 
unchecked into the Gulf of Mexico ecosystem. 
BP has consistently used their “science” to low-ball the amount 
of the spill and minimize its impacts on Gulf Coast residents and 
ecosystems.  
Additionally, contracted clean-up workers[,] who continue to 
struggle daily with serious health concerns brought on by their 
exposure to BP’s toxic crude and the oil dispersant Corexit, have often 
hit a wall of BP’s “independent” data.23 
The authors then introduce the ChemRisk BTEX report as an example 
of BP’s failure to “come clean” on the facts—an instance in which the 
company “tout[ed] industry-friendly scien[ce] to cloud the truth.”24  
Following several passages concerning the report’s findings, the blog’s 
investigatory gaze shifts from BP’s tactics of mitigation to ChemRisk’s 




20. See Foytlin & Savage, supra note 16. 
21. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1184; see also In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig 
“Deepwater Horizon” in Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 900–03 (E.D. 
La. 2012). 
22. Foytlin & Savage, supra note 16. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. (referencing public relations firms’ practice of disseminating “industry-friendly 
scien[ce] to cloud the truth”). 
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As it turns out, ChemRisk has a long, and on at least one occasion 
fraudulent, history of defending big polluters, using questionable 
ethics to help their clients avoid legal responsibility for their actions. 
One well-known example is the case that became the basis for 
the movie Erin Brockovich, where the polluter and defendant Pacific 
Gas and Electric (PG & E) was found to have paid ChemRisk to 
discredit research done by Chinese scientist Dr. Jian Dong Zhang.26 
Ultimately, the blog closes with a claim and stark comparison: while 
public relations firms continue to work tirelessly to minimize BP’s 
liability for the Deepwater Horizon oil explosion, residents of the Gulf 
Coast are left to wonder if anyone will ever “make it right.”27 
Following the blog’s publication on Huffington Post, a ChemRisk 
representative requested its retraction.28  Upon learning of the request, 
Foytlin posted the blog on her Facebook page and told ChemRisk, “kiss 
my derriere.”29  Foytlin informed the Huffington Post editor that she 
believed the blog’s content was factually accurate; thereafter, the piece 
remained posted on the website.30  In response, ChemRisk filed suit for 
defamation in both New York and Massachusetts.31  The authors, initially 
appearing pro se, successfully filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction in the New York state court.32  With respect to the 
suit filed in Massachusetts, Foytlin once again took to Facebook: “‘That’s 
cool fellas,’ . . . . ‘We’re up for Round Two.  Bring it, but you betta go tell 
ya Daddy that people with nothing to lose rarely do.  See ya in Boston, 
Bruh.’”33 
Thereafter, in August 2015, Foytlin and Savage filed a special motion 
to dismiss under Massachusetts’ anti-SLAPP statute.34  Despite “asserting 
that the claim against them was based solely on their exercise of the right 
 
26. Id.  The blog post explains that Dr. Zhang had conducted research on chromium-6—
a chemical compound found in Hinkley, California’s drinking water supply.  Id.  Dr. Zhang 
unearthed strong connections between chromium-6 and cancer.  Id.  The authors of the blog 
contend that “ChemRisk obtained Dr. Zhang’s data, and without his knowledge, intentionally 
manipulated the findings to contradict his own earlier studies.  The erroneous data was then 
submitted to the Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine (JOEM) as though it 
had been re-worked by Dr. Zhang personally.”  Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Meier, supra note 1. 
29. Id.; see also Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, 68 N.E.3d 1180, 1185 (Mass. 2017). 
30. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1185. 
31. Id. 
32. Id.; see also Meier, supra note 1. 
33. Meier, supra note 1. 
34. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1185. 
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to petition, that they had a reasonable factual basis for their statements, 
and that they caused no injury[,]” the Massachusetts Superior Court 
denied the motion.35  The judge determined that the defendants were not 
engaged in petitioning activity.36  In response, the defendants filed an 
interlocutory appeal and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) 
granted direct appellate review.37  Several months later, with the final 
decision pending, the New York Times reported that Foytlin and Savage 
seemed “unfazed.”38  In Savage’s opinion, the blog would have “slipped 
off into obscurity” but for ChemRisk’s defamation suit.39  In addition to 
drawing attention to the blog, the lawsuit “highlight[ed] how the Internet 
has blurred the line between activists and journalists”40 and created an 
opportunity for the SJC to draw a distinction between petitioning and non-
petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. 
On direct appellate review, the SJC found that the blog post qualified 
as petitioning activity.41  Although the court extensively analyzed whether 
the blog writers had exercised their own right to petition, it provided scarce 
reasoning with regard to the manner in which the blog post itself met the 
 
35. Id. 
36. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, No. 2014-3932, 2015 WL 13016335, at *1 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 2015), rev’d, 68 N.E.3d 1180 (Mass. 2017).  In denying the special motion, 
Judge Edward P. Leibensperger compared the conduct of Foytlin and Savage to that of the 
defendant in Fustolo v. Hollander, 920 N.E.2d 837, 838–40 (Mass. 2010).  Id.  Of note, in 
Fustolo, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of a journalist’s anti-
SLAPP special motion to dismiss because the statements at issue—newspaper articles Hollander 
penned pertaining to real estate development—did not constitute the seeking of redress for a 
grievance of her own.  See Fustolo, 920 N.E.2d at 842–43.  In short, in Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 
Judge Leibensperger determined that Foytlin and Savage were not petitioning the government 
to redress a grievance of their own.  Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 2015 WL 13016335, at *1.  See 
generally Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 821 N.E.2d 60, 68 n.14 (Mass. 2005) (“[O]ur only concern, as 
required by the statute, is that the person be truly ‘petitioning’ the government in the 
constitutional sense.”). 
37. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1185. 
38. Meier, supra note 1. 
39. Id.  Savage informed The New York Times “that the article was initially read by only 
400 people.”  Id. 
40. Id.; see also Noor Tagouri, Blurred Lines: Journalism or Activism?, HUFFPOST 
(Sept. 2, 2014, 4:18 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/noor-tagouri-/blurred-lines-
journalism-or-activism_b_5742944.html [https://perma.cc/ZY7A-UBSD]; cf. Patrick Butler, 
How to Define the Line Between Journalism and Activism in the Digital Age, INT’L CTR. FOR 
JOURNALISTS (May 2, 2016), https://www.icfj.org/blogs/how-define-line-between-journalism-
and-activism-digital-age [https://perma.cc/YQY8-DDAB] (reporting on discussions held at the 
International Symposium on Online Journalism regarding methods for distinguishing activism 
from journalism). 
41. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1183. 
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statute’s definition of the right to petition.42  Nonetheless, civil rights 
activists lauded the decision as a triumph in an era in which the right to 
speak out must be protected.43  The decision came, however, merely weeks 
after the Economist Intelligence Unit reported that the United States had 
fallen from a full democracy to a flawed democracy because of its high 
levels of distrust of government and low levels of political participation.44  
In juxtaposition, the Cardno ChemRisk decision and the Economist 
Intelligence Unit report highlight an inconvenient truth: we are living in 
an era in which the right to petition must be realized before it can be 
protected.  Without question, low levels of civic engagement threaten the 
future of democracy,45 but what are the consequences of classifying 
activities with attenuated ties to government action as political 
participation?  The value at stake—“a government ‘by the people, for the 
people, and of the people’”—remains the same.46  The threat to that value, 
however, becomes compounded when the importance of the connection 
between public participation and engagement with the government is 
overlooked.47 
 
42. See id. at 1187–88.  Although this Note does not focus on the debate pertaining to 
whether or not the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute requires special movants to have 
petitioned in their own right—that is, petitioned for the redress of their own grievances—others 
have broached the topic.  See David Kluft, Blogger-Journalist Protected from Defamation Suit 
by Anti-SLAPP Statute, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. (Feb. 28, 2017), 
http://www.trademarkandcopyrightlawblog.com/2017/02/blogger-journalist-protected-from-
defamation-suit-by-anti-slapp-statute/ [https://perma.cc/6KYD-3UFM] (reconciling the 
seemingly divergent opinions in Massachusetts’ anti-SLAPP jurisprudence on the matter of 
petitioning in one’s own right); see also Vince Pisegna & Tony Cichello, Blog Posts by 
Environmental Activists Protected by Massachusetts “Anti-SLAPP” Statute, LITIGATORS’ 
BLOG (Feb. 28, 2017), http://kb-law.com/blog/?p=410 (discussing the distinction between 
persons seeking redress on their own behalf and individuals who engage in petitioning activity, 
but not within their own right—such as hired consultants and paid experts). 
43. John R. Ellement, SJC Rules in Favor of Environmental Activists Who Questioned 




44. See DEMOCRACY INDEX 2016: REVENGE OF THE “DEPLORABLES”, ECONOMIST 
INTELLIGENCE UNIT 24 (2017), http://felipesahagun.es/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/
Democracy-Index-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FMC-DSQM] [hereinafter DEMOCRACY 
INDEX]; see also Amanda Erickson, The U.S. is No Longer a ‘Full Democracy,’ a New Study 
Warns, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/
wp/2017/01/26/america-is-no-longer-a-full-democracy-a-new-study-warns. 
45. See DEMOCRACY INDEX, supra note 44. 
46. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 8. 
47. See RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE 153–55 
(2012) (framing representative democracy as a “collaborative enterprise”).  “The ability to 
 
6 - WAUGH.PUBLISHER READY. 2.18.2019(DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2019  8:34 PM 
2019] “SEE YA IN BOSTON, BRUH” 149 
This Note contends that through its decision in Cardno ChemRisk, 
LLC v. Foytlin, the court revealed a paradox: the potential for judicial 
interpretation of the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute to obscure the 
statute’s underlying policy objective of promoting and protecting an 
involved citizenry.48  Part I begins by surveying the emergence of 
SLAPPs, the historical development of the First Amendment’s Petition 
Clause, and the SJC’s early SLAPP jurisprudence.  Part II discusses the 
enactment of the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute and traces its 
trajectory, focusing specifically on the method of statutory interpretation 
undertaken by the courts. 
Part III examines the judicial construction of the definition of the right 
to petition under the anti-SLAPP statute and demonstrates the ways in 
which courts have invoked objective, conduct-focused standards in order 
to preserve the statute’s legislative intent.  Part IV of this Note explores 
the court’s result-oriented approach in Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. 
Foytlin.49  Part V demonstrates the court’s deviation from existing anti-
SLAPP jurisprudence and details the manner in which the court’s analysis 
obscures the statute’s underlying policy objectives.  In an effort to 
reconcile the statute’s language and legislative intent, Part V introduces 
alternative interpretive frameworks used in other jurisdictions to 
determine the scope of petitioning activity. 
Ultimately, this Note argues that in construing the definition of the 
right to petition, the SJC should objectively assess a statement’s content, 
manner of issuance, and proximity to government action.  In the absence 
of an interpretive framework that is consistent with both the language and 
the policies underlying the statute—namely promoting and protecting an 
involved citizenry—the judiciary is bound to frustrate, rather than 
effectuate, the statute’s legislative intent. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF ANTI-SLAPP 
LEGISLATION AND INTERPRETATION 
SLAPPs are normally disguised as legitimate cases worthy of 
remedy.50  Most often, filers of such suits attempt to conceal the essence 
of the dispute by characterizing their claim as a defamation suit, an 
 
access and engage government, in a meaningful way, remains central to the success of the 
project of democratic self-government.”  Id. at 153. 
48. See Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, 68 N.E.3d 1180, 1186 (Mass. 2017). 
49. Id. at 1187–88. 
50. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 150. 
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antitrust action, or an abuse-of-process claim.51  Despite this variation, 
SLAPPs are uniformly “triggered by defendants’ attempts to influence 
government action—the exact activity covered by the Petition Clause of 
the First Amendment.”52  The narrative below details the development of 
the First Amendment’s right to petition and traces the trajectory of the 
Supreme Court’s Petition Clause jurisprudence. 
A. The First Amendment Right to Petition 
The Petition Clause concludes the First Amendment’s earnest 
enumeration of expressive rights, and safeguards a foundational American 
liberty.53  In pertinent part, the First Amendment provides that “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to petition 
the government for a redress of grievances.”54  Although the First 
Amendment established a number of rights, such as the freedom of speech 
and the right to assemble, the Petition Clause “enshrined as a right[,] a 
pre-existing and formalized system of petitioning for public and private 
grievances.”55  In an effort to distinguish the right to petition from other 
First Amendment rights, scholars have noted the early origins of 
petitioning.56 
In the years preceding the American Revolution, colonists understood 
the right to petition as “an affirmative, remedial [practice] which required 
governmental hearing and response.”57  Moreover, throughout the colonial 
 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 3. 
53. Catherine Phillips, Note, The Lost Democratic Institution of Petitioning: Public 
Employee Collective Bargaining as a Constitutional Right, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 652, 671–
72 (2012). 
54. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
55. Phillips, supra note 53, at 672 (emphasis omitted). 
56. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 15 (“[Notably], the right to petition is far older 
than its better-known cousins. . . .  It appears in the earliest English laws of more than 1,000 
years ago.”); see also Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and 
Significance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2163 (1998) (“The practice of 
petitioning the King for redress long antedated [the] Magna Carta.”).  Although the practice of 
petitioning precedes formal English law, the right of certain nobles to petition the king was first 
recognized in the Magna Carta.  David Bernstein, Freedom of Assembly and Petition, HERITAGE 
GUIDE TO THE CONST., https://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/amendments/1/essays/
141/freedom-of-assembly-and-petition [https://perma.cc/D2BH-K5W7].  Thereafter, in 1669, 
Parliament extended the right to petition to all British subjects.  Id.  Petitions were essentially 
the public’s sole means of communicating with the government, and as such, the right to petition 
boasts “a long-standing Anglo-American pedigree as a right independent of general free speech 
and press rights.”  Id. 
57. Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right to Petition Government for 
the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 142 (1986); accord Mark, supra note 56, at 2160–
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and post-colonial eras, petitioning was held as a central tenet of 
representative democracy because the practice served as a means for 
citizens to not only communicate their concerns to elected officials, but 
also to obtain governmental relief.58  The precise language of the 
Declaration of Independence demonstrates the fundamental nature of 
petitioning as a democratic practice necessitated by the notion of a 
government “of the people, by the people, and for the people.”59  The 
Declaration states, “[i]n every stage of these Oppressions We have 
Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions 
have been answered only by repeated injury.”60  Here, the particular 
phrasing succinctly illustrates that petitioning was initially understood as 
an affirmative process in which a request for government assistance 
received a hearing and governmental response.61 
In the years following the American Revolution, the practice of 
petitioning the government for a redress of grievances was implicit in the 
very notion of the new nation.62  At the time of the Constitution’s drafting, 
there was an expectation that petitioning, as a process, would continue and 
encompass “political receptiveness to public concern[].”63  It follows, 
therefore, that the primary focus of the founders’ debate was not whether 
petitioning itself was a right.64  Rather, the founders sought to determine 
whether petitioning should include a right of the people to instruct the 
 
62.  Upon adoption of the Massachusetts Body of Liberties in 1642, Massachusetts became one 
of the first colonies—if not the first—to explicitly safeguard the right to petition and codify its 
remedial function.  Compare Bernstein, supra note 56 (contending that the Massachusetts Body 
of Liberties was the first colonial charter to explicitly protect the right to petition), with Mark, 
supra note 56, at 2177 (“Massachusetts was among the first colonies explicitly to affirm the 
right [to petition].”). 
58. Phillips, supra note 53, at 672–73; cf. Bernstein, supra note 56 (noting that colonial 
assemblies did not grant every petition but answered every petition in an effort to keep with the 
English tradition of responding to legitimate prayers for relief). 
59. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 8. 
60. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 30 (U.S. 1776). 
61. See Phillips, supra note 53, at 674 (relating the Declaration of Independence’s “long 
list of grievances” to the notion of petitioning as a process of hearing and response); see also 
Higginson, supra note 57, at 155 (“That the Framers meant to imply a corresponding 
governmental duty of a fair hearing seems clear given the history of petitioning in the colonies 
and the colonists’ outrage at England’s refusal to listen to their grievances.”). 
62. See, e.g., McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482–83 (1985) (discussing the extensive 
history of the Petition Clause and its fundamental role in the Declaration of Rights enacted by 
state conventions); see also Mark, supra note 56, at 2191. 
63. Adam Newton, Freedom of Petition Overview, FREEDOM F. INST. (Oct. 10, 2002), 
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-of-petition/
freedom-of-petition-overview/ [https://perma.cc/TL4E-YATG]. 
64. Phillips, supra note 53, at 674. 
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government.65  Significantly, debates at the time “centered on 
understandings of representative democracy and the relationship between 
citizens and their representatives.”66  The connection between public 
participation and government—the very essence of the right to petition—
was implicitly assumed as an element bound for preservation as a right 
under the new nation.67  The historical record, therefore, indicates that “the 
right of the people . . . to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances”68 was designed to assure a particular freedom of expression—
one that reveres the relationship between public participation and 
government as a hallmark of American political life.69 
Today, conceptual understandings of the Petition Clause are at once 
expansive and limited in scope.70  In general terms, the right to petition is 
considered to protect “any peaceful, legal attempt to promote or 
discourage government action at any level (federal, state, or local) and in 
any branch (legislative, executive, judicial, and the electorate).”71  An 
activity need not consist of the literal filing of a petition in order to 
constitute an exercise of the right to petition, but citizens must engage in 
an activity that stands as a means of expressing their views to 
government.72  While the definition of the right has been extended beyond 
its literal text, knowledge of the right itself—and of its vital role in 
 
65. Mark, supra note 56, at 2206–07.  Specifically, the founders considered investing 
citizens with the power to tell elected representatives how to redress particular grievances and 
subsequently bind the representatives to the prescribed method.  See Phillips, supra note 53, at 
675. 
66. Phillips, supra note 53, at 675. 
67. Mark, supra note 56, at 2191–92.  The “near universal acceptance of petitioning” in 
the colonial era created a sense of resolve among colonists: “[P]etitioning [became] a 
constitutional right because people thought it was one and defended it as one.”  Id. at 2191.  
“Given the English and colonial heritage . . . it is unsurprising to find the right to petition 
unequivocally claimed by the people in the earliest state constitutions.”  Id. at 2195. 
68. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
69. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 15. 
70. See, e.g., Mark, supra note 56, at 2155 n.2 (discussing the manner in which the Petition 
Clause has become “peripheral . . . to mainstream constitutional discourse”). 
71. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 16 (footnote omitted). 
72. See id. (“Protected activities include . . . filing complaints, reporting violations of law, 
testifying before government bodies, writing letters, lobbying legislatures, advocating before 
administrative agencies, circulating petitions, conducting initiative and referendum 
campaigns . . . filing lawsuits. . . .  [P]eaceful demonstrations, protests, picketing, and boycotts 
aimed at producing government action.”). 
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affecting government action—constitutes a small fraction of the American 
public’s political consciousness.73 
The vast array of protected petitioning activities arguably mirrors the 
Petition Clause’s magnitude as “one of the ‘fundamental principles of 
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political 
institutions.’”74  Legal scholars, however, contend that the Petition Clause 
has fallen into desuetude; the right to petition no longer serves as the 
critical bond between the government and the governed.75  Despite 
Americans’ renowned attachment to the right to speak out, only three 
percent of Americans are aware that the First Amendment includes the 
Petition Clause.76  Unlike the First Amendment’s guarantees of freedom 
of speech, press, and religion, the right to petition is seldom addressed by 
scholars and scarcely covered in law school curriculums.77  Whereas the 
Petition Clause “recognizes that the ‘word of the represented’ . . . is a vital 
part of controlling the way government affects [Americans’] lives,” the 
“represented” largely fail to recognize that the Petition Clause provides 
the connective tissue that maintains the relationship between citizens and 
government.78 
Although Americans are largely unaware of the Petition Clause,79 
they operate under a number of assumptions reflecting its underlying 
 
73. See, e.g., Doh! Americans Know ‘The Simpsons’ Better Than First Amendment, LIVE 
SCI. (Mar. 1, 2006 5:48 AM), https://www.livescience.com/7069-doh-americans-simpsons-
amendment.html [https://perma.cc/FDZ7-U7CN]. 
74. Id. (quoting De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937)). 
75. David J. Shestokas, US Constitution’s First Amendment: Right to Petition for Redress 
of Grievances, DAVID J. SHESTOKAS (July 1, 2013), http://www.shestokas.com/constitution-
educational-series/us-constitutions-first-amendment-right-to-petition-for-redress-of-
grievances/ [https://perma.cc/5M8W-QWHG] (“The Right to Petition is unknown to most 
Americans, or if known, considered to be an extension of the first four rights, and not a right 
that stands on its own.”); see also Mark, supra note 56, at 2155 (“To say that the right is today 
moribund is grossly to understate the case.”). 
76. 2017 ANNENBERG CONSTITUTION DAY CIVICS SURVEY, ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y 
CTR. (2017), https://cdn.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/
Appendix_Civics_survey_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4VZ-YMP8] [hereinafter CIVICS 
SURVEY]. 
77. KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 47, at 81 (noting the Petition Clause’s “relative obscurity” 
to contemporary practitioners and legal scholars); PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 18. 
78. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 16; see also The Associated Press, We Know 
‘Simpsons’ Better Than Freedoms, QUAD-CITY TIMES (Mar. 1, 2006), https://qctimes.com/
news/local/we-know-simpsons-better-than-freedoms/article_f7e3d53a-ec21-5c55-aa60-
8987d44b2bdd.html [hereinafter We Know ‘Simpsons’] (discussing Americans’ misconceptions 
and misidentification of First Amendment rights). 
79. The 2015 State of The First Amendment, FREEDOM F. INST. 2 (2015), 
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/FAC_SOFA15_
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policies.80  Americans, for instance, presume that they can speak out.81  
They also assume that the political system that encourages them to do so 
will protect them.82  A number of Americans believe the right to speak out 
is absolute.83  Although the clause itself validates Americans’ 
presumptions pertaining to the existence of the right, the judicial system’s 
interpretation of the clause disproves their presumptions pertaining to the 
extent of protection it affords.84 
B. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Petition Clause 
Although the Supreme Court’s Petition Clause jurisprudence is 
neither robust nor extensive,85 the Court has consistently held that the right 
to petition does not constitute an absolute immunity for communications 
made to the government.86  In its initial consideration of the Petition 
Clause, the Court recognized the critical relationship between the exercise 
of the right to petition and the productive operation of government.87  Over 
the course of the twentieth century, the Court reiterated its earlier 
 
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9G5-KMCY] (reporting that only two percent of American adults 
sampled were familiar with the right to petition); We Know ‘Simpsons’, supra note 78 
(discussing findings that one percent of Americans are aware of the right to petition); CIVICS 
SURVEY, supra note 76, at 2 (finding that only three percent of respondents knew of the First 
Amendment’s Petition Clause). 
80. See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 47, at 81. 
81. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 2; see also Barack Obama (@barackobama), 
FACEBOOK (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/barackobama/posts/
10155227588436749 [https://perma.cc/K4JB-PB56] (“What makes us American is our fidelity 
to a set of ideals . . . that all of us share an obligation to stand up, speak out, and secure our most 
cherished values for the next generation.”). 
82. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 2; see also J. Gerald Herbert, Symposium: The Right 
to Vote in Peace, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 23, 2018, 3:13 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2018/01/symposium-right-vote-peace/ [https://perma.cc/NLJ5-3S6N] (“The First Amendment 
protects every American’s right to speak out on contentious issues . . . .”).  But see Amanda A. 
Konarski, Comment, The Reporter’s Privilege is Essential to Checks and Balances Being 
Accessible to the American Electorate, 11 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 258, 275 (2014) (contending 
that the American government vehemently pursues legal action against those who “speak out” 
about questionable governmental practices). 
83. See Emily Swanson, Nearly Half of Americans Grasp the First Amendment About as 
Well as Sarah Palin Does, HUFFPOST (Jan. 15, 2014, 4:33 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/15/first-amendment-poll_n_4603896.html 
[https://perma.cc/2PWY-3FVZ]. 
84. See, e.g., McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 483 (1985). 
85. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 18. 
86. See, e.g., McDonald, 472 U.S. at 483. 
87. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875) (“The very idea of a 
government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for 
consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances.”). 
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sentiments, but indicated with clarity that the Petition Clause does not 
afford an absolute privilege despite its “assurance of a particular freedom 
of expression.”88  For instance, in McDonald v. Smith, the Court reasoned 
that “[a]lthough the values in the right of petition as an important aspect 
of self-government are beyond question, it does not follow that the 
Framers of the First Amendment believed that the Petition Clause 
provided absolute immunity.”89  The Court declined to “elevate the 
Petition Clause to special First Amendment status” by deviating from its 
dedicated course of interpreting the Petition Clause as the conference of a 
qualified privilege.90 
Despite the Supreme Court’s consistent characterization of the right 
to petition as a qualified immunity, the Court has wavered in its 
articulation of the qualification.91  Quite similarly, in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, federal and state courts were unable to “agree on a 
single, clear-cut standard for petitioning activity that [was] ‘over the line’ 
and unworthy of protection.”92  In interpreting the right to petition, courts 
often invoked ill-defined tests that necessitated a subjective inquiry into 
the petitioner’s mental state.93  While some judges “refused to protect 
[petitioners] whose government petitioning was done out of ‘malice,’” 
others deemed petitioning done with an intent to harass as an unqualified 
activity.94 
In 1991, however, the Court articulated an objective standard for 
determining whether an activity warranted immunity under the Petition 
Clause, and created the potential for more consistent applications of the 
immunity assured by the right to petition.95  Although the objective 
standard originated from a line of antitrust litigation involving the 
Sherman Antitrust Act,96 courts have applied the standard in a number of 
 
88. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 482–83. 
89. Id. at 483. 
90. Id. at 485. 




95. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991). 
96. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).  Congress passed its first antitrust law, The Sherman 
Antitrust Act, in 1890.  The Antitrust Laws, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/MM2V-XP25].  Enacted with 
the purpose of preserving free competition in trade, the Act prohibits unreasonable restraints on 
trade and monopolization.  Id.  See generally Jenny Pacquette, Old is Not Always Wise: The 
Inapplicability of the Sherman Act in the Age of the Internet, 89 TEMP. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 13–
21 (2017) (discussing the purpose of the Sherman Antitrust Act and its judicial trajectory). 
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cases involving petitioning activities.97  The case law, briefly surveyed 
below, upholds significant First Amendment principles pertaining to the 
right to petition and provides instructive guidance regarding the manner 
in which immunity under the Petition Clause should be granted.98 
1. The Sham Exception 
In 1957, forty-one long-distance trucking operators commenced an 
action in the United States District Court of Pennsylvania against twenty-
four major railroads for alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.99  
The operators claimed that the railroads conducted an intentionally 
injurious public relations campaign in an effort to suppress deregulation 
of the trucking industry.100  Whereas the district court found in favor of 
the trucking operators, the Supreme Court held that the Petition Clause 
immunized the activities of the railroads “at least insofar as those activities 
comprised mere solicitation of governmental action with respect to the 
passage and enforcement of laws.”101  The Court reasoned: 
In a representative democracy such as this, these branches of 
government act on behalf of the people and, to a very large extent, the 
whole concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people 
to make their wishes known to their representatives.  To hold that the 
government retains the power to act in this representative capacity and 
yet hold, at the same time, that the people cannot freely inform the 
government of their wishes would impute to the Sherman Act a 
purpose to regulate, not business activity, but political activity, a 
purpose which would have no basis whatever in the legislative history 
of that Act.102 
Although the Court advanced an expansive articulation of the right to 
petition, it refused to construe the privilege as an absolute immunity.103  
Rather, the Court acknowledged that situations may arise in which 
 
97. See Kathleen L. Daerr-Bannon, Causes of Action: Bringing and Defending Anti-
SLAPP Motions to Strike or Dismiss, 22 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 317, § 4 (2003) (“[L]ower 
courts have not been reluctant at all to apply the principles enunciated beyond the antitrust arena, 
and it is generally accepted that these holdings are broadly applied.”). 
98. See Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. at 365; United Mine Workers of Am. v. 
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 660 (1965); E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 128 (1961). 
99. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. at 128–29. 
100. Id. at 129–30. 
101. Id. at 138. 
102. Id. at 137. 
103. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 24. 
 
6 - WAUGH.PUBLISHER READY. 2.18.2019(DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2019  8:34 PM 
2019] “SEE YA IN BOSTON, BRUH” 157 
publicity campaigns—seemingly designed to influence governmental 
action—are “mere shams” to cloak actual attempts to interfere with the 
operations of business competitors.104  In such an instance, application of 
the Sherman Antitrust Act would be justified, despite countervailing 
constitutional considerations.105 
2. The Rise of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine 
In United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, the Supreme 
Court further developed the principle put forth in Noerr and thereby 
established what has become known as the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine.106  
In Pennington, small coal mine operators initiated an antitrust action 
against the coal miners’ union for allegedly conspiring with large coal 
companies to force small miners out of business.107  Operators argued that 
the union and large companies jointly—and successfully—petitioned the 
Secretary of Labor to increase minimum wage beyond the point that 
operators could afford for the purpose of driving them out of the 
competitive market.108 
The Court extended immunity to the activities of the coal miners’ 
union in holding that “a concerted genuine effort to influence public 
officials is shielded from the Sherman Act ‘regardless of intent or purpose.  
Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate antitrust laws even 
though intended to eliminate competition.’”109  Although the Court did not 
expressly include a discussion of the “sham exception,” its analysis makes 
clear that “[i]t is not the intent [of the conduct] that counts.”110  Rather, the 
determinative “issue is whether efforts to influence government officials 
[are] genuine.”111 
3. Outcome over Process: The Omni Standard 
In City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,112 the Court 
illustrated the importance of evaluating conduct—rather than intent—in 
its narrow construction of the “sham exception” of the Noerr-Pennington 
 
104. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. at 144. 
105. See id. 
106. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669–72 (1965); see 
also Daerr-Bannon, supra note 97. 
107. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 659–60. 
108. Id.; see also PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 25. 
109. Daerr-Bannon, supra note 97 (quoting Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670). 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 365 (1991). 
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Doctrine.113  Omni involved an antitrust action wherein Omni Outdoor 
Advertising (OOA) alleged that Columbia Outdoor Advertising (COA) 
violated the Sherman Antitrust Act when it lobbied city council members 
to adopt restrictive zoning ordinances that created anticompetitive 
impacts.114  OOA argued that COA’s petitioning of the city council 
triggered the “sham exception” of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine; the 
Court disagreed.115  The Court stated that the exception is limited to 
“situations in which persons use the governmental process itself—as 
opposed to the outcome of that process—as an anticompetitive 
weapon.”116  The Court reasoned that COA unquestionably intended to 
interfere with OOA’s business, but it did not attempt to do so through the 
lobbying process; instead, it relied on “the ultimate product of that 
lobbying and consideration, viz., the zoning ordinances.”117 
Courts have invoked the objective, outcome-focused Noerr-
Pennington-Omni standard in contexts far beyond the bounds of antitrust 
litigation.118  Moreover, it is generally accepted that its foundational 
principles apply broadly to any instance involving activity that falls within 
the scope of the Petition Clause.119  As the Court reflected in Omni: 
[I]t is obviously peculiar in a democracy, and perhaps in derogation of 
the constitutional right “to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances,” to establish a category of lawful state action that citizens 
are not permitted to urge.  Thus, beginning with [Noerr], we have 
[ruled that the] federal antitrust laws . . . do not regulate the conduct 
of private individuals in seeking anticompetitive action from the 
government.  This doctrine . . . rests ultimately upon a recognition that 
the antitrust laws, “tailored as they are for the business world, are not 
at all appropriate for application in the political arena.”120 
 
113. See Daniel O. Conkle, Combatting SLAPPs: Absolutism Is Not the Answer, 49 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 761, 764 (1997). 
114. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. at 368–69. 
115. Id. at 380–81. 
116. Id. (first emphasis added).  In this instance, the phrase “outcome of [the] 
governmental process” refers to judgments, legislation, and other forms of government action 
and/or inaction.  PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 27.  Using the “governmental process” as an 
anticompetitive weapon refers to “invok[ing] the costs, delays, and inconveniences of the 
government procedure only, without regard to outcome.”  Id. 
117. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. at 381. 
118. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 28; see also Daerr-Bannon, supra note 97. 
119. Daerr-Bannon, supra note 97. 
120. Conkle, supra note 113, at 764 n.29 (quoting Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 
at 379–80). 
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In essence, the Court’s antitrust jurisprudence demonstrates that 
activity in the political arena demands safeguarding against legal actions 
that arise in response to conduct that constitutes First Amendment 
petitioning.121 
II. THE MASSACHUSETTS ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE 
On December 29, 1994, the Massachusetts Legislature enacted 
Chapter 231, Section 59H, of the Massachusetts General Laws—
legislation commonly known as the Massachusetts Anti-SLAPP 
Statute.122  Enacted over the veto of Governor William Weld, the statute 
reflected the legislature’s recognition of, and response to, the “disturbing 
increase” in lawsuits brought to intimidate and discourage citizens from 
exercising their right to petition.123  Courts and scholars alike, however, 
have identified one particular lawsuit as the “impetus for [the] 
introduction of the anti-SLAPP legislation.”124  The lawsuit arose in 1991 
between fifteen residents of Rehoboth, Massachusetts and a developer 
seeking residential construction permits.125  Out of concern for local 
wetland protection, the residents signed a petition opposing the 
construction project.126  In response, the developer brought suit.127  After 
nine months of litigation and $30,000 in legal fees, the lawsuit’s dismissal 
provided relief to the Rehoboth residents and prompted legislators to 
create a procedural remedy for the early dismissal of such burdensome, 
costly, and vexatious litigation.128  Although “[t]he typical mischief that 
the legislation intended to remedy was lawsuits directed at individual 
citizens of modest means for speaking publicly against development 
 
121. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 28. 
122. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2018); David A. Kluft, The Scalpel or the 
Bludgeon? Twenty Years of Anti-SLAPP in Massachusetts, BOS. B.J. (Jul. 9, 2014), 
https://bostonbarjournal.com/2014/07/09/the-scalpel-or-the-bludgeon-twenty-years-of-anti-
slapp-in-massachusetts/ [https://perma.cc/X8KR-BRFJ]. 
123. Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Mass. 1998). 
124. Id.; Kluft, supra note 122. 
125. Duracraft Corp., 691 N.E.2d at 939. 
126. Id. 
127. Id.  See generally Linda Borg, Citizens Favor Ban on SLAPP Suits: Residents Testify 
That the Lawsuits Brought By Big Businesses Deprive Them of Their First Amendment Rights, 
PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 23, 1993, at C01, 1993 WLNR 5768283.  The developer, South State 
Savings Bank of Brockton, claimed the residents’ petition was “a ‘conspiracy’ that ‘interfered 
with the advantageous business relations of the bank.’”  Id. 
128. Duracraft Corp., 691 N.E.2d at 939. 
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projects,”129 judicial interpretation of the statute has vastly expanded its 
reach.130 
A. Procedural Elements of the Massachusetts Anti-SLAPP Statute 
The Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute adjusts state civil procedure 
by permitting a defendant to bring an expedited special motion to dismiss 
when the claims asserted against the defendant are based on his or her 
petitioning activity.131  In relevant part, the statute provides: 
In any case in which a party asserts that the civil claims, 
counterclaims, or cross claims against said party are based on said 
party’s exercise of its right of petition under the constitution of the 
United States or of the commonwealth, said party may bring a special 
motion to dismiss.  The court shall advance any such special motion 
so that it may be heard and determined as expeditiously as possible.  
The court shall grant such special motion, unless the party against 
whom such special motion is made shows that: (1) the moving party’s 
exercise of its right to petition was devoid of any reasonable factual 
support or any arguable basis in law and (2) the moving party’s acts 
caused actual injury to the responding party.  In making its 
determination, the court shall consider the pleadings and supporting 
and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or 
defense is based.132 
A defendant may file the special motion to dismiss “within sixty days 
of the service of the complaint.”133  Typically, once the special motion is 
filed, discovery proceedings are stayed.134  In addition to creating a 
procedure to stay and terminate lawsuits based on petitioning, the statute 
states that “[i]f the court grants [the] special motion to dismiss, the court 
shall award the moving party costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.”135 
Special motions to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute are subject 
to a now well-established two-step burden-shifting test.136  In the first 
 
129. Id. at 940. 
130. See, e.g., Kluft, supra note 122. 
131. Yurko & Choy, supra note 5, at 16. 
132. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2018). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id.  Under the anti-SLAPP statute, judges have no discretion with respect to the 
payment of attorney’s fees and costs.  McLarnon v. Jokisch, 727 N.E.2d 813, 818 (Mass. 2000). 
136. See Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 943 (Mass. 1998).  The 
two-part test arose from the court’s acknowledgement that a persistent conundrum had 
“bedeviled the statute’s application.”  Id.  Specifically, “[b]y protecting one party’s exercise of 
its right of petition, unless it can be shown to be sham petitioning, the statute impinges on the 
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stage, the special movant must “make a threshold showing through the 
pleadings and affidavits that the claims against it are ‘based on’ the 
petitioning activities alone and have no substantial basis other than or in 
addition to the petitioning activities.”137  If the special movant meets its 
initial burden, the statute requires the burden to shift to the nonmoving 
party.138  The nonmoving party must then “show by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the moving party lacked any reasonable factual support 
or any arguable basis in law for its petitioning activity.”139  If the special 
motion to dismiss is denied, defendants have a right to interlocutory 
appellate review.140 
B. Five Statutorily Enumerated Definitions of Petitioning 
Litigation under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute often turns on 
whether the lawsuit is based on the defendant’s petitioning activity.141  As 
an initial matter, therefore, allowance or denial of the special motion to 
dismiss requires courts to determine whether the conduct at issue 
constitutes petitioning.142  The statute broadly defines the protected right 
to petition143: 
As used in this section, the words “a party’s exercise of its right 
of petition” shall mean any written or oral statement made before or 
submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other 
 
adverse party’s exercise of its right to petition, even when it is not engaged in sham petitioning.”  
Id.  Whereas the Massachusetts appeals court interpreted “the statutory language ‘shall 
grant . . . [the] special motion’ as ‘may’ grant,” the SJC developed the two-part test and thereby 
disallowed “committing decisions on such special motions to dismiss wholly to judicial 
discretion.”  Id. (second alteration in original). 
137. Id. 
138. Id.  But see Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 75 N.E.3d 21, 38 (Mass. 2017) 
(“A nonmoving party’s claim is not subject to dismissal as one ‘based on’ a special movant’s 
petitioning activity if, when the burden shifts to it, the nonmoving party can establish that its 
suit was not ‘brought primarily to chill’ the special movant’s legitimate exercise of its right to 
petition.”).  The augmentation of the Duracraft framework warrants recognition, but because it 
does not impact the original two-step test, or judicial determinations regarding the definition of 
petitioning, discussion of the alternative showing exceeds the scope of this Note.  Id. 
139. Baker v. Parsons, 750 N.E.2d 953, 961 (Mass. 2001). 
140. Fabre v. Walton, 781 N.E.2d 780, 784 (Mass. 2002) (“As in the governmental 
immunity context, the denial of a special motion to dismiss interferes with rights in a way that 
cannot be remedied on appeal from the final judgment.”). 
141. Pyle, supra note 14 (explaining that a special motion to dismiss under an anti-SLAPP 
statute is typically won or lost on the question of whether the activity is petitioning). 
142. Id. 
143. N. Am. Expositions Co. v. Corcoran, 898 N.E.2d 831, 840–41 (Mass. 2009) 
(“Consistent with the expressed legislative intent, ‘petitioning’ has been consistently defined to 
encompass a ‘very broad’ range of activities in the context of the anti-SLAPP statute.”). 
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governmental proceeding; any written or oral statement made in 
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a 
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental 
proceeding; any statement reasonably likely to encourage 
consideration or review of an issue by a legislative, executive, or 
judicial body or any other governmental proceeding; any statement 
reasonably likely to enlist public participation in an effort to effect 
such consideration; or any other statement falling within constitutional 
protection of the right to petition government.144 
Following the statute’s enactment, the SJC recognized that specific 
activities meet the definition of petitioning: campaigning in elections, 
lobbying governmental bodies, and performing demonstrations all amount 
to petitioning activity apt for a SLAPP attack.145  Not all activities, 
however, clearly fall within the definition of petitioning activity.146  
Because the statute enumerates five categories of a party’s exercise of its 
right to petition,147 courts must employ canons of statutory construction to 
determine whether the activity seeking the statute’s special motion to 
dismiss constitutes petitioning.148 
C. Initial Interpretations of the Massachusetts Anti-SLAPP Statute 
The SJC interpreted the anti-SLAPP statute for the first time in its 
landmark decision, Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp.149  The 
court identified the legislature’s failure to “address concerns over [the 
statute’s] breadth and reach”150 as the impetus for its initial attempt to 
construe the statute in a way that averted unconstitutionality and 
“preserve[d] as much of the legislative intent as . . .  possible.”151  Judicial 
interpretation of the statute following the Duracraft opinion has similarly 
 
144. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2018). 
145. Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 940 (Mass. 1998) (citing 
George W. Pring, SLAPPS: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 3, 5–6 (1989)). 
146. See, e.g., Andrew R. Dennington, Do Anti-SLAPP Statutes Protect Bloggers?, 59 
DRI FOR DEF. 36, 39 (2017) (explaining that there is no “bright-line rule” for determining 
whether a particular blog constitutes protected petitioning activity). 
147. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2018). 
148. Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 821 N.E.2d 60, 63 (Mass. 2005); see also SHAMBIE SINGER, 
3A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 67.2 (8th ed. 2018) (“The key 
to interpreting a procedural statute is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent as expressed 
in the statute.”). 
149. Duracraft Corp., 691 N.E.2d at 939; see also Hoffberg, supra note 5, at 100. 
150. Duracraft Corp., 691 N.E.2d at 941. 
151. Id. at 943. 
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sought to preserve the statute’s legislative intent.152  For instance, in 
Kobrin v. Gastfriend, the court explained that in determining whether an 
activity falls within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute, the court applies 
[T]he general rule of statutory construction that a statute is to be 
interpreted “according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from 
all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the 
language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, 
the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be 
effectuated.”153 
Accordingly, Massachusetts courts have ascertained from the text of 
the statute and the cause of its enactment that the right to petition protected 
by the anti-SLAPP statute is the right contained within the Petition Clause 
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.154  Although the SJC has 
acknowledged that a broad definition of petitioning activity is consistent 
with the statute’s legislative intent, it has also recognized that the “scope 
of the statute has its limits.”155  In finding that “[t]he right of petition 
contemplated by the Legislature is . . . one in which a party seeks some 
redress from the government,” the court established a critical limitation—
one that “expressly implicat[es] the term’s constitutional meaning” in the 
process of determining whether an activity constitutes petitioning under 





152. See Fustolo v. Hollander, 920 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Mass. 2010); N. Am. Expositions 
Co. v. Corcoran, 898 N.E.2d 831, 840 (Mass. 2009); Kobrin, 821 N.E.2d at 64; Fabre v. Walton, 
781 N.E.2d 780, 783 (Mass. 2002); Baker v. Parsons, 750 N.E.2d 953, 959 (Mass. 2001). 
153. Kobrin, 821 N.E.2d at 63–64 (quoting Triplett v. Oxford, 791 N.E.2d 310, 313 
(Mass. 2003)); see also SINGER, supra note 148 (“The statute’s language is the best and most 
reliable index of the statute’s meaning and must be consulted first.  The language of the statute 
may be construed in view of the statute’s purpose.”). 
154. See Kobrin, 821 N.E.2d at 65 (“The constitutional ‘right of petition’ is a term of art 
that the Legislature did not adopt casually or accidentally.  The Legislature’s decision to refer 
to the right of petition secured in the Federal and State Constitutions must be accorded 
significance in order to effectuate the legislative intent.”). 
155. Id. at 67; see also Corcoran, 898 N.E.2d at 840–41 (“Consistent with the expressed 
legislative intent, ‘petitioning’ has been consistently defined to encompass a ‘very broad’ range 
of activities in the context of the anti-SLAPP statute.”). 
156. Kobrin, 821 N.E.2d at 65. 
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III. INVOKING OBJECTIVITY TO EFFECTUATE THE MASSACHUSETTS 
ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE’S LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
Prior to the enactment of the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute, 
Governor William Weld described the legislation “as ‘a bludgeon when a 
scalpel would do.’”157  Against the backdrop of this characterization, 
practitioners and legal scholars have argued that the Massachusetts courts 
have wavered between each metaphor in applying the statute’s 
provisions.158  David A. Kluft, for instance, observed that “[w]hile some 
decisions have expanded—or confirmed—broad access to the statute’s 
protections, other decisions have sharpened and narrowed the kind of 
activity it protects.”159  Although examinations of Massachusetts’s anti-
SLAPP jurisprudence have reviewed the courts’ record of expanding 
access to effectuate the legislative intent, while also simultaneously 
limiting the scope of “petitioning activity,” the significance of objectively 
evaluating statements has gone largely undiscussed.160  In the following 
subparts, this Note illustrates two instances in which the courts have 
invoked objectivity to reconcile the expansive reach of the statute with the 
legislature’s intent to promote a fully involved citizenry and protect the 
constitutional right to petition.  The first subpart addresses judicial 
removal of the public concern element,161 and the second subpart 
discusses the judiciary’s development of the mirror image rule.162 
A. The Public Concern Element 
Although a sizeable number of state legislatures have limited 
citizens’ access to special anti-SLAPP procedural protections by inserting 
 
157. Kluft, supra note 122. 
158. See id. 
159. Kluft, supra note 122.  David A. Kluft is a partner at Foley Hoag in Boston, 
Massachusetts.  Our People, FOLEY HOAG, http://www.foleyhoag.com/people/kluft-david 
[https://perma.cc/WUQ7-MA62]. 
160. But see Richard J. Yurko, Fasten Your Seatbelt: The SJC Revises the Standard for 
Anti-SLAPP Motions, BOS. B.J. (Aug. 9, 2017), https://bostonbarjournal.com/2017/08/09/
fasten-your-seatbelt-the-sjc-revises-the-standard-for-anti-slapp-motions/ 
[https://perma.cc/J5CG-BNXQ]. 
161. See infra Section III.A; see also Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 
935, 941 (Mass. 1998) (holding that petitioning activity need not involve a matter of public 
concern in order to qualify for protection under the statute). 
162. See infra Section III.B; see also, e.g., Wynne v. Creigle, 825 N.E.2d 559, 566 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2005) (finding that the repetition of statements to media may possess the characteristics 
of petitioning as defined in the statute). 
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a public concern requirement,163 the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute 
invokes no such condition.164  Initially, judicial interpretation of the 
statute—in the time between its enactment and the issuance of the 
Duracraft opinion—confined its application to instances in which citizens 
were sued for speaking out on matters of public concern.165  In Duracraft, 
however, the court reasoned “that the phrase ‘public concern’ was struck 
from the [anti-SLAPP] bill before it was passed in final form.”166  The 
court acknowledged that legislative debate relating to the statute’s 
enactment included discussions about the “need to protect the right of 
petition on matters of public concern,” but placed significant weight on 
the fact that “the phrase was removed from the text of the statute.”167  It 
would be inappropriate, the court reasoned, to read a public concern 
element into the statute when the condition was expressly removed by the 
legislature.168  With its firm rejection of the public concern requirement, 
the court underscored an important feature of the Massachusetts statute—
one that both reflects and effects the legislature’s “inten[t] to enact very 
broad protection for petitioning activities.”169 
Critics of the Duracraft decision contend that foregoing the public 
concern requirement consigns the anti-SLAPP statute’s original objective 
to oblivion.170  For instance, one scholar argues that while “[Duracraft] is 
consistent with the language in the statute, [it is] inconsistent with the 
policies underlying the concept of anti-SLAPP statutes, namely, to 
remove legal impediments on citizens seeking to speak out on matters of 
public concern.”171  The Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute, however, was 
specifically designed to safeguard the constitutional right to petition.172  
 
163. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-7-7-1(a) (2018) (“This chapter applies to an act in 
furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the Constitution of the United 
States or the Constitution of the State of Indiana in connection with a public issue or an issue of 
public interest.”); 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2 (2018) (protecting claims based on a person’s 
exercise of the right to petition or right of free speech “in connection with a matter of public 
concern”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1041 (2018) (requiring exercise of the right to petition or 
right of free speech to be “in connection with a public issue”). 
164. McLarnon v. Jokisch, 727 N.E.2d 813, 816 (Mass. 2000). 
165. Hoffberg, supra note 5, at 102. 
166. Duracraft Corp., 691 N.E.2d at 941. 
167. Id. 
168. See id. 
169. Id. at 940.  But see Hoffberg, supra note 5, at 102–06 (arguing the removal of the 
public concern element is inconsistent with the anti-SLAPP statute’s underlying policy 
objectives). 
170. See Hoffberg, supra note 5, at 106; see also Kluft, supra note 122. 
171. Hoffberg, supra note 5, at 105–06. 
172. Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 821 N.E.2d 60, 66 (Mass. 2005). 
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“The Legislature intended the statute to encourage ‘full participation by 
persons and organizations and robust discussion of issues before 
legislative, judicial, and administrative bodies.’”173  Conceivably, “full 
participation” and “robust discussion”—two fundamental aspects of the 
democratic process reflected in petitioning activities174—encompass 
matters beyond the classic SLAPP paradigm.175  Nonetheless, proponents 
of the public interest requirement argue that in its absence, there exists no 
clear criteria for determining an individual’s eligibility to assert the status 
of “petitioner.”176  Post-Duracraft anti-SLAPP jurisprudence, however, 
indicates otherwise. 
The Massachusetts courts’ resolution of lawsuits involving private 
disputes and the anti-SLAPP statute demonstrate that the qualification—
the criteria for eligibility—lies with the nature of the special movant’s 
conduct.177  Implicated by the first-prong of the two-prong anti-SLAPP 
framework, a court’s evaluation of the alleged petitioning activity 
necessitates a focus on conduct.178  For instance, in Office One, Inc. v. 
Lopez, the court stated that initially, “[t]he focus solely is on the conduct 
complained of, and, if the only conduct complained of is petitioning 
activity, then there can be no other ‘substantial basis’ for the claim.”179  In 
Office One, the purchasers of commercial condominium units filed suit 
against the condominium’s board of trustees for defamation and alleged 
business interference.180  The court determined that the suit was based on 
the board members’ communications with the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), which urged against the sale of condominium units 
to the plaintiff.181  Because the “FDIC acts ‘in the name of, or on behalf 
 
173. Id. (quoting Preamble to 1994 House Doc. No. 1520). 
174. Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Mass. 1998). 
175. See generally Hoffberg, supra note 5, at 97–99 (illustrating the classic SLAPP 
paradigm). 
176. See id. at 104–06 (contending there is a “near limitless eligibility” to qualify for 
immunity under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute). 
177. See Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 769 N.E.2d 749, 756–57 (Mass. 2002); McLarnon v. 
Jokisch, 727 N.E.2d 813, 817 (Mass. 2000); Donovan v. Gardner, 740 N.E.2d 639, 641–44 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2000). 
178. See supra Section II.B. 
179. Office One, Inc., 769 N.E.2d at 757. 
180. Id. at 749. 
181. Id. at 757 (“All of the conduct alleged as unlawful falls within the broad definition 
of petitioning activity protected by the statute.”).  In addition to the board members’ direct 
communications with the FDIC, the court also considered communications between unit owners 
urging one another to petition against the FDIC’s sale of units to plaintiff as petitioning activity.  
Id. 
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of, the United States’ to promote stability [in the] banking system,”182 the 
conduct at issue reflected the very core of petitioning—that is, the seeking 
of governmental redress.  The nature of the allegedly unlawful conduct 
was dispositive of whether the special movants were eligible to invoke the 
anti-SLAPP statute’s protection.183  Consequently, because “[t]he right to 
petition a governmental body for redress of a grievance is the very essence 
of petitioning activity,”184 the court’s extension of protection to special 
movants who have sought governmental redress on a matter of private 
concern seemingly effectuates, rather than subverts, the statute’s 
legislative intent. 
B. The Mirror Image Rule 
Consistent with the text and expressed legislative intent of the 
Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute, courts often find that statements made 
apart from official government proceedings constitute petitioning 
activity.185  Special motions seeking protection for statements made to the 
media have generated a great deal of debate within the Massachusetts 
Appeals Court’s anti-SLAPP jurisprudence.186  Because the statute “was 
enacted by the Legislature to protect citizens from lawsuits designed to 
chill their constitutional right to petition the government for redress of 
grievances,”187 the appeals court—in line with the SJC—reasoned “that 
the protection of the statute extends only to petitioning in a constitutional 
sense, that is, activities that involve a seeking [of redress] from the 
government.”188  In the context of statements made to the media, the issue 
became whether a statement made to the press can satisfy the standard of 
seeking governmental redress.  Massachusetts courts answered this 
question in the affirmative.189  But how can a statement directed to the 
press, as opposed to the government, qualify as a petition in the 
 
182. Id. at 757 n.15 (quoting United States v. Sweeney, 226 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 2000)). 
183. See id. at 757. 
184. N. Am. Expositions Co. v. Corcoran, 898 N.E.2d 831, 841 (Mass. 2009). 
185. Id. at 840–41. 
186. See generally Kalter v. Wood, 855 N.E.2d 421 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006); Global Naps, 
Inc. v. Verizon New Eng., Inc., 828 N.E.2d 529 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005); Wynne v. Creigle, 825 
N.E.2d 559 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005). 
187. Wynne, 825 N.E.2d at 564. 
188. Id. at 565. 
189. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 75 N.E.3d 21, 32 (Mass. 2017) 
(finding statements made to the Boston Globe constituted petitioning activity under the 
Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute). 
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constitutional sense of the term?  The answer lies with the mirror image 
rule. 
The appeals court first developed the mirror image rule in Wynne v. 
Creigle.190  The rule serves as a means of identifying a statement’s 
connection to the seeking of governmental redress; in applying the rule, 
courts jointly consider a statement’s content and the context in which it 
occurred.191  In Wynne, Thomas Wynne, Jr., a discharged firefighter, 
brought a defamation action against Amy Creigle, the surviving spouse of 
a former firefighter.192  Prior to the lawsuit, Wynne was under 
investigation for professional misconduct by the Greenfield Fire 
Department.193  In connection with the investigation, Creigle submitted 
written testimony to the department indicating that she and her deceased 
husband had been repeatedly harassed by Wynne.194  Thereafter, Creigle 
made statements to the Greenfield Recorder regarding the harassment she 
endured before and after her husband’s death.195  Three years after the 
pertinent article’s publication, Wynne filed suit against Creigle for 
defamation on May 4, 2001.196  In response, Creigle filed an anti-SLAPP 
special motion to dismiss.197  In considering the anti-SLAPP motion on 
appeal, the court reasoned that the statements made to The Recorder 
[M]ust be viewed in the context in which they occurred: as a response 
to the plaintiff’s providing the newspaper with the statements of the 
firefighters, other documents from the hearing of June 15, 1998, and 
his dismissal letter.  The later statements of the defendant to The 
Recorder were essentially mirror images of those she made during and 
“in connection with” the departmental investigation of the plaintiff.  
 
190. Wynne, 825 N.E.2d at 566.  Although the SJC has not explicitly invoked the mirror 
image rule, it has referenced the standard.  See Corcoran, 898 N.E.2d at 841 (citing to the court’s 
use of “mirror image” language in Wynne); see also Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 859 N.E.2d 
858, 865 (Mass. 2007) (finding challenged statements were not repetitions of statements initially 
made to a government body, and therefore not petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP 
statute). 
191. See Wynne, 825 N.E.2d at 565–66. 
192. Id. at 563. 
193. Id. at 562. 
194. Id. at 562–63. 
195. Id. at 563 (“[Creigle] also reiterated many of the comments she made in her May 15, 
1998 statement to the fire department, namely that the plaintiff harassed her family shortly 
before and after her husband’s death.”). 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 564.  Initially, the defendant’s special motion to dismiss was allowed.  Id.  
Plaintiff made a motion for relief from the judgment of dismissal, but that motion was denied.  
Id.  In a second judgment, under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute, the defendant was 
awarded attorney’s fees and costs.  Id.  Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed.  Id. 
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Taken in context, her mere repetition of those statements to the media 
was also possessed of the characteristics of petitioning activity.198 
In other words, the content of the statement, in conjunction with the 
context in which the statement was given, satisfied the statutory 
requirement of exercising the right to petition because it reflected the 
essence of petitioning activity—that is, the seeking of governmental 
redress. 
In cases following Wynne, the appeals court further refined the mirror 
image rule as a means of limiting the statute’s expansive scope.199  For 
instance, in Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., the court 
rejected Verizon’s claim that its employee’s statement to the Boston Globe 
satisfied the statutory definition of petitioning.200  Verizon argued that the 
statement at issue met the “in connection with” definition of petitioning 
because the statement referenced a matter under review by the Department 
of Telecommunications and Energy (DTE).201  Referencing Wynne, the 
court reasoned that “the statements [at issue] were not ‘mirror images’ of 
what was said in a governmental forum, nor were they made in 
conjunction with any legislative petitioning. . . .  Instead, the comments 
were incidental observations that were not tied to the petitioning activity 
in a direct way.”202  Based on the content of the statement—and the 
context in which it occurred—the court narrowly tailored the “in 
connection with” definition of petitioning.203  In recognition of the fact 
that the right to petition contemplated by the statute encompasses the 
seeking of government redress, the court reasoned that “tangential 
statements” unrelated to the petitioning process fall beyond the ambit of 
the statute.204  “That a statement concerns a topic that has attracted 
 
198. Id. at 565–66 (footnote omitted). 
199. See, e.g., Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon New Eng., Inc., 828 N.E.2d 529, 533–34 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2005). 
200. Id. at 530. 
201. See id. at 531; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2018). 
202. Global Naps, Inc., 828 N.E.2d at 534 (citation omitted). 
203. Id. at 532.  The court also reasoned that the context of the statute must be taken into 
account when evaluating a statement’s eligibility for protection.  Id.  The other enumerated 
definitions of petitioning—specifically the first, third, and fourth definitions—“support reading 
‘in connection with’ as embodying, to some extent, similar purposive elements.”  Id.  In a similar 
vein, the court faulted Verizon’s argument for failing to recognize the significance of the anti-
SLAPP statute’s reference “to a ‘party’s exercise of its right of petition under the constitution 
of the United States or of the Commonwealth.’”  Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, 
§ 59H).  The statutory language precludes the inclusion of statements made “to influence public 
opinion in a general way unrelated to government involvement.”  Id. at 534. 
204. See id. at 534. 
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governmental attention, in itself, does not give that statement the character 
contemplated by the statute.”205 
Although the SJC has yet to formally apply the mirror image rule in 
its anti-SLAPP jurisprudence, it has recognized and relied on the rule’s 
underlying principles.206  Statements directed to the press may very well 
constitute petitioning under the broad definition afforded by the statute, 
but such statements must possess the essential characteristics of the 
constitutional right to petition as contemplated by the legislature.207  
Considerations of a statement’s content and context are critical in 
determining whether a statement constitutes petitioning activity.208 
IV. VEERING OFF COURSE: THE CARDNO CHEMRISK ANALYSIS 
The way in which a court reaches its result is just as important—if 
not more important—than the result itself.209  Principled decision making 
is preferred over result-oriented jurisprudence.210  In Cardno ChemRisk, 
LLC v. Foytlin, the analysis wavered between principled and result-
oriented.211  The court persuasively recounted the facts to establish the 
defendants—Cherri Foytlin and Karen Savage—as citizens of modest 
means with an extensive record of environmental advocacy.212  After 
identifying Foytlin as a full-time activist and Savage as a participant in 
environmental advocacy, the court relayed that “both defendants have 
devoted substantial time to exploring [the oil spill’s] environmental 
consequences, particularly its effects on cleanup workers, and to 
advocating on behalf of those adversely affected.”213  Foytlin, the court 
explained, “is a mother of six [who] support[s] herself with modest 
monthly stipends” and Savage is a former middle school teacher and a 
single mother of four.214  Moreover, the court chronicled the defendants’ 
 
205. Id. at 533. 
206. See N. Am. Expositions Co. v. Corcoran, 898 N.E.2d 831, 841 (Mass. 2009).  With 
reference to the concept of “mirror images” discussed in Wynne, the SJC stated that “[i]n order 
to determine if statements are petitioning, we consider them in the over-all context in which 
they were made.”  Id. 
207. See Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 821 N.E.2d 60, 65–66 (Mass. 2005). 
208. See N. Am. Expositions Co., 898 N.E.2d at 841. 
209. LEONARD W. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAW: THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 437 (1974). 
210. See id. 
211. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, 68 N.E.3d 1180, 1186–91 (Mass. 2017). 
212. Id. at 1184. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. at 1186 n.10. 
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efforts to raise awareness of the consequences of the spill,215 which 
included “marching from New Orleans to Washington, 
D.C.[,] . . . meeting with federal officials[,] and corresponding with 
federal agencies such as . . . the Environmental Protection Agency 
[and] . . . the Department of Health and Human Services.”216  Importantly, 
the court couched the blog post, the statement at issue under the statute, 
as one of the defendants’ efforts in this regard.217 
The court’s portrayal of the “pertinent” factual background material 
was not haphazard; indeed, it was integral to the finding that the 
defendants were petitioning in their own right as citizens.218  Intentions 
aside, the court effectively shifted its focus from the substance of the 
statement at issue to the standing of the defendants that drafted it.  As a 
result, the court’s assessment of the well-established threshold question—
whether the statement fits within one of the five statutorily enumerated 
categories219—and ultimate determination possessed an element of 
inevitability: 
The Huffington Post blog posting falls within at least one of the 
enumerated definitional categories.  It formed part of the defendants’ 
ongoing efforts to influence governmental bodies by increasing the 
amount and tenor of coverage around the environmental consequences 
of the spill, and it closes with an implicit call for its readers to take 
action.  Given this, the article fits squarely within the second [sic] 
clause of G. L. c. 231 § 59H: “any statement reasonably likely to enlist 
public participation.”220 
In this passage, the court proffered two factors to support its finding: 
the blog “formed part of the defendants’ ongoing efforts” and it includes 
an implicit call for action.221  Here, the court focused chiefly on the 
defendants’ intent222—a factor the court previously deemed irrelevant to 
 
215. Id. at 1187. 
216. Id. at n.13. 
217. Id. at 1184. 
218. See id. at 1184–85, 1190. 
219. See supra Section II.B. 
220. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1187–88 (footnotes omitted). 
221. Id. 
222. See Dennington, supra note 146, at 37 (discussing Cardno ChemRisk, LLC and the 
tendency of courts to engage in scienter-like analyses when determining whether particular 
online statements are petitioning activity). 
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the first prong of the anti-SLAPP two-part test.223  Rather than 
distinguishing the statement at issue from the motive behind the statement, 
the court invested substantial weight in the defendants’ intent in 
determining that the blog post fit the statute’s definition of petitioning.224 
Similarly, with respect to the second factor, the implicit call, the court 
attributed great significance to the final sentence of the blog post.225  
Earlier in the opinion, the court framed the final sentence as a question: 
“The article closes by asking whether ‘anyone will ever . . . make [things] 
right’ in the Gulf Coast.”226  In actuality, the article does not close with a 
question, but rather an assertion: 
Meanwhile, and while the BP trial continues in New Orleans, 
Gulf Coast residents are left wondering if BP will ever be held 
responsible for the damage done to their fisheries, ecosystems and 
livelihoods, wait to see if their bodies will ever recover from an assault 
of BP’s oil and dispersants, and wonder if anyone will ever—in the 
words of Purple Strategies’ spin writers, found in the mouth of former 
BP President Tony Hayward—“make it right.”227 
Nonetheless, the court held that the statement was an implicit call for 
action and thereby an exercise of the defendants’ right to petition.228  In so 
holding, the court vastly expanded the scope of the phrase “reasonably 
likely.”229  Moreover, in its analysis, the court did not include the entirety 
of the fourth definitional category, which reads as follows: “any statement 
reasonably likely to enlist public participation in an effort to effect such 
consideration.”230  The portion of the clause omitted from the opinion 
refers to the third clause: “any statement reasonably likely to encourage 
consideration or review of an issue by a legislative, executive, or judicial 
 
223. Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 769 N.E.2d 749, 757 (Mass. 2002) (holding a petitioner’s 
motive is irrelevant with respect to the first prong of the test because the conduct complained of 
is the sole focus). 
224. See Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1187–88. 
225. See id. 
226. Id. at 1185 (alteration in original). 
227. Foytlin & Savage, supra note 16. 
228. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1187. 
229. See Fustolo v. Hollander, 920 N.E.2d 837, 841 (Mass. 2010) (assuming without 
deciding that the contents of an article fit the enlistment clause because the article created so 
much community opposition that developer had to withdraw variance application); Office One, 
Inc. v. Lopez, 769 N.E.2d 749, 757 (Mass. 2002) (holding condominium unit owners urging 
other unit owners to petition the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation against the sale of the 
condominiums fit the enlistment clause of the anti-SLAPP statute). 
230. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2018); see also Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 
N.E.3d at 1187–88. 
 
6 - WAUGH.PUBLISHER READY. 2.18.2019(DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2019  8:34 PM 
2019] “SEE YA IN BOSTON, BRUH” 173 
body or any other governmental proceeding.”231  In failing to include the 
full text of the definition, the court failed to give effect to the full text of 
the clause; specifically, the relevance of the public’s effort to effect 
governmental consideration to the definition of petitioning activity.232 
Under close inspection, the conclusory method of analysis 
undertaken by the court with respect to the definition of petitioning marks 
a departure from Massachusetts’ existing anti-SLAPP jurisprudence.233  In 
its opinion, the court stated that its “cases recognize that the anti-SLAPP 
statute, like the constitutional right it safeguards, protects those looking to 
‘advanc[e] causes in which they believe,’ as well as those seeking to 
protect their own private rights.”234  Importantly, however, the court has 
previously recognized that despite the legislature’s intent to enact very 
broad protection, “the scope of the statute has its limits.”235  Moreover, the 
court has acknowledged that the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute—
unlike similar statutes in other states—only protects the right to petition, 
not all First Amendment rights.236  Therefore, while the statute may afford 
courts the opportunity to protect those looking to advance causes in which 
they believe, the statute only extends its procedural protections to those 
who exercise their right to petition—regardless of intent, purpose, or 
cause.237 
Despite the SJC’s recognition of boundaries in its previous anti-
SLAPP jurisprudence, its extension of the statute’s protection in Cardno 
ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin was heralded by attorneys and civil rights 
activists as an important decision in an era in which the right to petition 
 
231. Supra note 230. 
232. See Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 821 N.E.2d 60, 68 (Mass. 2005) (reasoning courts are 
obligated to give meaning to all of a statute’s words); see also SINGER, supra note 148.  “Courts 
assume every word, phrase, and clause in a legislative enactment is intended and has some 
meaning and none is inserted accidentally.  Courts give effect to all the language of a statute as 
a harmonious whole, rendering no portion meaningless or superfluous.”  SINGER, supra note 
148 (footnotes omitted). 
233. See Yurko, supra note 160, at 38 n.3 (“[T]he Supreme Judicial Court [has] repeatedly 
eschewed any inquiry into defendant’s subjective motive for petitioning in the first part of the 
test.”). 
234. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1189 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Town of Hanover v. New Eng. Reg’l Council of Carpenters, 6 N.E.3d 522, 528 (Mass. 
2014)). 
235. Fustolo v. Hollander, 920 N.E.2d 837, 844 (Mass. 2010) (quoting Kobrin, 821 
N.E.2d at 67). 
236. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1186 n.11; see also Fustolo, 920 N.E.2d at 
844 n.12 (“The Massachusetts Legislature did not include ‘free speech’ in [the provisions of the 
anti-SLAPP statute].”). 
237. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2018). 
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must be safeguarded.238  In celebrating the decision as a “complete 
victory,” Attorney John H. Reichman explained that “[t]he court made it 
clear that a blogger who is writing about an issue of public concern, and 
seeking to get the public involved . . . will be protected.”239  Ironically, 
however, the court’s broad construction of the definition of the right to 
petition obscures the legislative purpose underlying the anti-SLAPP 
statute.240  The Massachusetts Legislature intended the statute to promote 
and protect a fully involved citizenry,241 but the court’s conclusory 
analysis diminishes the significance of a statement’s connection to 
governmental participation under the anti-SLAPP statute. 
V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
After the Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin opinion, Massachusetts 
courts are well-positioned to significantly weaken the critical connection 
between petitioning activity and governmental participation under the 
anti-SLAPP statute.  The potential for further deviation from the statute’s 
underlying policy objectives necessitates that Massachusetts adopt an 
alternative interpretive framework—one that echoes its own early anti-
SLAPP jurisprudence242 and reflects methods of statutory construction 
undertaken in other jurisdictions.243  In order to effectuate the legislative 
policies underlying the anti-SLAPP statute, courts must objectively 
distinguish between statements made to influence public opinion and 
statements made to petition the government in the constitutional sense of 
the phrase.  The approaches undertaken by courts in Minnesota and 
Pennsylvania serve as examples of invoking objective criteria to evaluate 
a statement’s standing as petitioning activity.244  In each jurisdiction, 
judicial interpretation effectuates the legislative intent of the state’s anti-
SLAPP statute by upholding the importance of the connection between 
the right to petition and participation in government. 
 
238. Ellement, supra note 43. 
239. Id. 
240. See Cardno ChemRisk, LLC, 68 N.E.3d at 1186–87; see also Kobrin, 821 N.E.2d at 
68 (discussing the manner in which a broad interpretation of the anti-SLAPP statute may fail to 
effect its legislative intent). 
241. Kobrin, 821 N.E.2d. at 66. 
242. See Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 769 N.E.2d 749, 750 (Mass. 2002); see also Duracraft 
Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Mass. 1998). 
243. See SINGER, supra note 148 (“Where legislation is structured in the same manner as 
the laws of other states . . . courts may look to cases from the other states . . . which have 
construed such similar provisions for interpretive insight and guidance.”). 
244. See Freeman v. Swift, 776 N.W.2d 485, 488–92 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009); Penllyn 
Greene Assocs. v. Clouser, 890 A.2d 424, 429–32 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005). 
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A. Minnesota’s Citizens Participation Act 
The Minnesota Legislature enacted the Citizens Participation Act of 
1994 several months before Massachusetts enacted its anti-SLAPP 
statute.245  Although the wording of the Minnesota statute is significantly 
different from the wording of the Massachusetts statute, the legislative 
intent is the same: protecting citizen participation in government.246  The 
Minnesota statute defines public participation as “speech or lawful speech 
that is genuinely aimed in whole or in part at procuring favorable 
government action.”247  Substantively, the statute immunizes such speech 
or lawful conduct from liability—unless the conduct or speech constitutes 
a tort or violation of a person’s constitutional rights.248  Upon enactment, 
Professors Canan and Pring heralded the statute as “a breakthrough in 
effectiveness” as it promised broad and straightforward protection for 
public participation in government.249  Judicial interpretation of what 
constitutes public participation in Minnesota warrants similar praise.250  In 
primarily focusing on a statement’s content—rather than the subjective 
intent of a speaker—the Minnesota courts offer an instructive method of 
interpretation. 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals first determined the definition and 
scope of public participation in Freeman v. Swift.251  Three statements 
were at issue in the case—an email and two blog posts regarding the chief 
executive officer of Nexus, a juvenile sex-offender treatment facility set 
for relocation in Bradbury Township.252  The author of the statements—
defendant Janette J. Swift—vigorously opposed the relocation of the 
facility as a resident of Bradbury Township and the founder of Onamia 
Area Citizens for Responsible Growth.253  Based upon the content of the 
email and blog entries, the plaintiffs in the case sued Swift for defamation.  
 
245. See 1994 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 566 (West); see also PRING & CANAN, supra 
note 2, at 200. 
246. Freeman, 776 N.W.2d at 488. 
247. MINN. STAT. § 554.01(6) (2018); see also Lisa Blomgren Amsler & Tina Nabatchi, 
Public Engagement and Decision-Making: Moving Minnesota Forward to Dialogue and 
Deliberation, 42 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 1629, 1648–49 (2016) (noting that Minnesota 
statutes, with the exception of MINN. STAT. § 554.01, fail to expressly define the contours of 
public participation). 
248. MINN. STAT. § 554.03 (2018). 
249. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 200–01. 
250. See, e.g., Freeman, 776 N.W.2d at 489. 
251. Id. at 490. 
252. Id. at 487. 
253. Id. 
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Swift moved unsuccessfully to dismiss the defamation action under 
Minnesota’s anti-SLAPP statute.254 
Similarly, based upon the content of the communications, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s determination that 
the statements were not entitled to immunity under the statute.255  The 
court held that “the determination of whether a communication is entitled 
to immunity under section 554.03 depends on the nature of the statement, 
the purpose of the statement, and the intended audience.”256  As in Cardno 
ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin,257 the court assessed the nature of the statement 
by extensively recounting the defendant’s activism relating to the 
relocation of the treatment facility.258  Swift attended meetings and 
presented petitions to government bodies involved, communicated her 
strong opposition to state representatives, and expressed problems 
associated with relocation to local government officials.259  Unlike the 
SJC, however, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reasoned that “the mere 
fact that discrete communications are made in the context of public 
participation does not confer immunity.”260 
Admittedly, the expansive breadth of the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP 
statute—specifically the definition of petitioning activity as any statement 
made in connection with an issue under consideration or review—requires 
courts to consider the overall context in which the statements are made.261  
Nonetheless, the exercise of distinguishing between the content of a 
challenged statement and a speaker’s record of participation should be a 
necessary step in the process of determining whether an activity 
constitutes petitioning.  This critical consideration ensures that the right to 
petition is exercised before the statute’s procedural protections are 
extended, thereby ensuring the statute’s language and legislative intent are 




255. Id. at 490. 
256. Id. 
257. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, 68 N.E.3d 1180, 1184–85 (Mass. 2017). 
258. Freeman, 776 N.W.2d at 487. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. at 490. 
261. N. Am. Expositions Co. v. Corcoran, 898 N.E.2d 831, 841 (Mass. 2009). 
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B. Pennsylvania’s Participation in Environmental Law or Regulation 
Act 
Whereas Massachusetts and Minnesota extend anti-SLAPP 
protections to petitioning activities in all contexts, Pennsylvania’s anti-
SLAPP legislation limits protection to public participation in the arena of 
environmental law.262  The Pennsylvania Legislature enacted The 
Participation in Environmental Law or Regulation Act on December 20, 
2000.263  In the preamble of the Act, the General Assembly stated that “[i]t 
is contrary to the public interest to allow lawsuits, known as Strategic 
Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP), to be brought primarily 
to chill the valid exercise by citizens of their constitutional right to 
freedom of speech and to petition the government for the redress of 
grievances.”264  Moreover, in contemplating the legislation, the General 
Assembly reasoned that “[i]t is in the public interest to empower citizens 
to bring a swift end to retaliatory lawsuits seeking to undermine their 
participation in the establishment of State and local environmental policy 
and in the implementation and enforcement of environmental law and 
regulations.”265  Although the scope of Pennsylvania’s anti-SLAPP statute 
is narrower than its Massachusetts companion, the statutes share a 
common objective: to protect the constitutional right to petition.266 
Section 8302 of The Participation in Environmental Law or 
Regulation Act identifies the communications that are eligible for 
protection as petitioning activity.267  Pursuant to the Act, the general rule 
is that a person who 
[F]iles an action in the courts of [the] Commonwealth to enforce an 
environmental law or regulation or that makes an oral or written 
communication to a government agency relating to enforcement or 
implementation of an environmental law or regulation shall be 
immune from civil liability in any resulting legal proceeding for 
damages where the action or communication is aimed at procuring 
favorable governmental action.268 
 
262. See 27 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8301–05 (2018). 
263. Id. 
264. Preamble to the Act of December 20, 2000, Pub. L. 980, No. 138. 
265. Id. 
266. Penllyn Greene Assocs. v. Clouser, 890 A.2d 424, 434 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005). 
267. 27 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8302(a) (2018). 
268. Id. 
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The Act enumerates three categorical definitions of statements that 
qualify for immunity under the Act.269  In addition to statements made 
before executive, legislative, and judicial proceedings, the Act immunizes 
statements made to government agencies in connection with the 
enforcement of environmental regulations.270  Finally, the Act contains an 
“in connection with” clause—statements made “in connection with an 
issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive or judicial 
body or any other official proceeding authorized by law” constitute 
petitioning activity and are thus eligible for protection.271 
As in Massachusetts, initial application of the Act’s “in connection 
with” clause prompted the Pennsylvania judiciary to interpret the statutory 
definition of petitioning activity.272  Despite the seemingly vast potential 
for statements to meet the standard of “in connection with,” the 
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court declared that “the Act does not 
perfunctorily immunize all communications merely because they concern 
an environmental issue under consideration or review by a government 
body.”273  In Penllyn Greene Associates v. Clouser, the Commonwealth 
Court recognized that the legislature embedded a purposive element 
within the “in connection with” definition.274  The case involved a dispute 
between two residential development firms and three residents of 
Montgomery County, Pennsylvania.275  Following a two-year permitting 
process, the developers began constructing residential homes on property 
adjacent to the residents’ homes.276  In addition to publicly opposing the 
development of the land, the residents filed a series of appeals challenging 
the validity of the development project.277  After the residents withdrew 
their appeal three hours before the scheduled hearing, the developers 
brought suit against the residents for abuse of process and tortious 
interference.278  In response, the residents sought immunity under The 
 
269. 27 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8301 (2018). 
270. Id. 
271. Id. 
272. See Penllyn Greene Assocs. v. Clouser, 890 A.2d 424, 433 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005). 
273. Id. 
274. See id. (“The Act and the legislative intent are clear.  Section 8302 of the Act, 27 Pa. 
C. S. § 8302(a), affords immunity only where the communication or action is ‘aimed at 
procuring favorable governmental action.’”). 
275. Id. at 427. 
276. Id. 
277. See id. at 430 (“Residents claim that they began voicing their concerns to the local, 
state and federal government in the 1980’s regarding the possibility of the adverse effects of 
developing the Property which they asserted was contaminated.”). 
278. Id. at 428.  The developers also alleged trespass.  Id. 
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Participation in Environmental Law or Regulation Act by claiming that 
the statements at issue were made “in connection with” a matter under 
review.279 
In its evaluation of the case, the Commonwealth Court reasoned that 
“the Act was designed to protect those persons targeted by frivolous 
lawsuits based on their constitutionally protected government petitioning 
activities.”280  The court stated: “[w]hen determining whether a 
communication is entitled to immunity, the court must look to the nature 
of the statement keeping in mind the intended audience and the purpose 
of the communication.”281  Whereas the residents argued that their 
statements “were just a ‘continuation’ of their longstanding and 
continuing governmental petitioning,” the court found that the nature of 
the communications precluded an extension of the Act’s protection.282  
Rather than rely on the residents’ record of past petitioning—and 
subjectively stated motivations—the court looked to objective indicia in 
order to determine the nature of the statements.283  The intended audience 
of the statement, for instance, consisted of real estate agents and home 
buyers.284  In light of this fact, the court reasoned that “[t]he 
communications were not for the larger purpose of calling governmental 
or public attention to any alleged contamination, or to influence the 
government in its consideration or review of an environmental issue.”285  
The residents, therefore, were ineligible for immunity under the Act.286 
Despite the limited contextual reach of Pennsylvania’s anti-SLAPP 
statute, the Pennsylvania judiciary’s method of statutory construction 
offers valuable instruction.  Throughout the course of its analysis in 
Penllyn Greene Associates. v. Clouser, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth 
Court elevated the constitutional significance of the right to petition.287  
As a result, the court’s classification of statements as petitioning or non-
 
279. Id. at 430. 
280. Id. at 434. 
281. Id. at 433. 
282. Id. at 430, 433. 
283. Compare id. at 433 (holding courts must consider the nature of a statement, its 
intended audience, and its purpose), with discussion supra Part IV (analyzing the SJC’s reliance 
on the defendants’ subjectively stated intent in Cardno ChemRisk, LLC). 
284. Penllyn Greene Assocs., 890 A.2d at 434. 
285. Id. 
286. Id. 
287. See, e.g., id. (“The Act was designed to protect those persons targeted by frivolous 
lawsuits based on their constitutionally protected government petitioning activities.”). 
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petitioning activity depended largely on the statement’s connection to 
governmental redress.288  As the court explained: 
The purpose of the Act is to encourage and open the lines of 
communication to those government bodies clothed with the authority 
to correct or enforce our environmental laws and regulations. 
. . . . 
Accordingly, [the court] concludes that the immunity authorized 
by the Act is restricted to those persons who petition the government 
or make any statement reasonably likely to encourage consideration 
or review of an environmental issue by a legislative, executive, or 
judicial body or in any official proceeding in an effort to effect such 
consideration.  Immunity is triggered if, and only if, the 
communication is aimed at procuring favorable government action, 
regardless of whether the communication is made directly to the 
government or to third parties.289 
As the court made clear in Penllyn Greene Associates. v. Clouser, 
determinations regarding the aim of a communication cannot be reached 
by evaluating a party’s subjective claim.  Rather, an objective assessment 
of the nature of the statement—which includes consideration of the 
statement’s intended audience—is the most effective method to effectuate 
the Act’s legislative intent. 
CONCLUSION 
For over twenty years, the Massachusetts judiciary has sought to 
interpret and apply the anti-SLAPP statute in a manner consistent with its 
text and legislative intent.  Upon enactment, the “anti-SLAPP statute 
broadly defined petitioning activities, defined a qualified immunity for 
those activities, and crafted an objective test and an expedited procedure 
for enforcing that immunity.”290  Judicial interpretations of the statute, 
however, have extended the statute’s protections beyond the classic 
SLAPP scenario.291  Nonetheless, the SJC has consistently effectuated the 
 
288. Id. at 433–34. 
289. Id. 
290. See Yurko, supra note 160, at 36. 
291. See Baker v. Parsons, 750 N.E.2d 953, 958 (Mass. 2001) (reviewing the statute’s 
legislative history led the court to conclude that the statute was intended to go beyond the typical 
case).  There is mounting pressure—in Massachusetts and throughout the country—to further 
expand the reach of anti-SLAPP protections.  See, e.g., Katheleen Conti, TripAdvisor Wants 
Tougher Law Protecting Online Reviewers from Suits, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 28, 2017), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/09/28/tripadvisor-wants-tougher-state-law-
protecting-online-reviewers-from-lawsuits/ojcWjYVjprYiR5OPwXafRM/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/M42P-PKU3] (discussing proposed legislation to extend anti-SLAPP 
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statute’s legislative intent by focusing its inquiry on conduct.292  In 
focusing on conduct, rather than a given defendant’s subjectively stated 
intent, the court ensured that the right to petition was exercised—in the 
constitutional sense—before extending the statute’s protections. 
In Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, however, the court shifted its 
focus and highlighted the potential for judicial interpretation to obscure 
the policy rationales underlying the anti-SLAPP statute.293  The court’s 
conclusory analysis regarding the manner in which the blog post fit the 
definition of the right to petition was largely based on the defendants’ 
subjectively stated intent to increase coverage of the oil spill’s 
environmental consequences.294  As a result, the anti-SLAPP statute was 
successfully invoked to immunize an opinionated blog—but was the right 
to petition exercised in the constitutional sense of the phrase?  In the 
absence of an alternative interpretative framework—one that objectively 
assesses a statement’s content, the manner in which it is issued, and its 
proximity to government action—Massachusetts courts will risk 
obscuring the critical importance of the connection between a statement 
and public participation under the anti-SLAPP statute. 
Interpretive methods undertaken in other jurisdictions offer insight 
and instruction for future interpretation of the Massachusetts Anti-SLAPP 
statute.295  Minnesota has highlighted the importance of examining the 
nature of a statement, the purpose of statement, and the statement’s 
intended audience.296  Similarly, the approach undertaken in Pennsylvania 
demonstrates the importance of examining objective indicia of a 
statement’s eligibility for protection as petitioning activity.297  Ultimately, 
looking to the content of a statement, rather than a speaker’s subjectively 
 
protections to forms of public speech, such as online reviews).  Whereas the Massachusetts anti-
SLAPP statute does not address consumer reviews, other jurisdictions, such as the District of 
Columbia, have included language in their anti-SLAPP legislation that expressly addresses the 
issue.  See D.C. CODE § 16-5501(3) (2018) (“‘Issue of public interest’ means an issue related 
to . . . a good, product, or service in the market place.”).  Not surprisingly, the “public concern 
element” is at the crux of judicial debates surrounding anti-SLAPP statute’s applicability to 
consumer reviews.  See, e.g., Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc., 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 131, 143 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2014) (finding business reviews on Yelp’s website contain matters of public concern).  See 
generally Eric Goldman, Two More Cases Hold That Anti-SLAPP Laws Protect Consumer 
Reviews, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Dec. 13, 2012), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2012/12/two_more_cases.htm [https://perma.cc/6RJV-4MHU]. 
292. See N. Am. Expositions Co. v. Corcoran, 898 N.E.2d 831, 841 (Mass. 2009). 
293. Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, 68 N.E.3d 1180, 1187–88 (Mass. 2017). 
294. Id. at 1189. 
295. Freeman v. Swift, 776 N.W.2d 485 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009); Penllyn Greene Assocs. 
v. Clouser, 890 A.2d 424 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005). 
296. See Freeman, 776 N.W.2d at 490. 
297. See Penllyn Greene Assocs., 890 A.2d at 434. 
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stated intent, ensures that protection will be afforded to parties that 
exercise the right to petition in the constitutional sense of the phrase.  
Despite differences in statutory language, the approaches developed in 
other jurisdictions could be adopted in Massachusetts in a manner that is 
consistent with Massachusetts case law.  The adoption of an objective 
approach would provide consistent assessments of challenged statements 
and will eliminate the need to inquire about subjective intent for purposes 
of meeting the statutory definition.  In the absence of such an approach, 
the judiciary is bound to frustrate, rather than effectuate, the statute’s 
legislative intent. 
